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ABSTRACT
Does the economic model of optimal punishment explain the variation in the sentencing of
murderers? As the model predicts, we find that murderers with a high expected probability of
recidivism receive longer sentences. Sentences are longest in murder types where apprehension rates
are low, and where deterrence elasticities appear to be high. However, sentences respond to victim
characteristics in a way that is hard to reconcile with optimal punishment. In particular, victim
characteristics are important determinants of sentencing among vehicular homicides, where victims
are basically random and where the optimal punishment model predicts that victim characteristics
should be ignored. Among vehicular homicides, drivers who kill women get 56 percent longer
sentences. Drivers who kill blacks get 53 percent shorter sentences.
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The economic approach to punishment pioneered by Bentham (1823) and Becker (1968) is
normative. Their work, and the literature that has followed, analyzes "how many resources and
how much punishment should be used to enforce different kinds of legislation?" (Becker, 1968).
But is this normative theory of optimal deterrence also a good positive theory of punishment?
Are prison sentences meted out in a way that corresponds with the implications of Becker's
model? Can we explain the differences in sentence lengths with a theory where punishment is
meant only to incapacitate and deter, or do we need a theory that also incorporates a taste for
vengeance?1
This paper examines the detenninants of punishment by examining the sentences given out to
murderers in the U.S. Using Bureau of Justice Statistics data on murders, we test the basic
implications of the economic model. Becker (1968) argues that sentences should be longer when
apprehension rates are lower. Indeed, across murder types, we find that sentences are highest
when the expected apprehension rate for murderers is lowest.
An optimal deterrence model also suggests that punishments should be stiffer in crimes where
the deterrence elasticities are greater. We do not have direct measures of deterrence elasticities
across types of homicide, but it is likely that inelastically supplied crimes will have less variance
across cities (see Appendix 1). For inelastically supplied crimes, cross-city differences in
probabilities of arrest or returns to crimes will cause less variation. As such, we use cross-city
crime variances as a proxy for deterrence elasticities and we find that sentences are stiffer from
murder types that appear to be less elastic.
A third implication of optimal punishment is that criminals with higher recidivism rates should
be incarcerated for longer periods. Using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics "Recidivism
of Felons on Probation 1986-1989," we predict the probability of recidivism for each murderer.
This probability is based on the murderer's past record, demographic characteristics and type of
crime. We then correlate predicted recidivism with sentence length and find that murderers with
Bentham asserts that the only function of puthshment is to reduce crime through deterrence and incapacitation. He
views the taste for vengeance as illegitimate. Becker does not incorporate a taste for vengeance into the model, but
he does not argue against catering to that taste.
2higher recidivism rates receive stiffer penalties. Thus, in these three tests, the optimal
punishment model appears to actually predict the variation in sentence lengths
However, in a fourth test of the optimal punishment model, it becomes clear that there is more to
sentencing murderers than optimal deterrence and incapacitation. The optimal punishment
model suggests that victim characteristics will not matter when the victim is determined at
random. Using two data sets on vehicular homicides, we look for the importance of victim
characteristics. In the Bureau of Justice Statistics national data set, we find that victim race, age
and criminal record still determine sentence length even when the victim was killed in a
vehicular homicide. Drivers who kill black victims get substantially shorter sentences. Drivers
who kill women get substantially longer sentences.Indeed, there is no difference in the
magnitude of victim effects (when using the logarithm of sentence length) between vehicular
homicides and other types of murder. In a data set on vehicular homicides in Alabama, we still
find that there is a substantial victim gender effect. There is no statistically discernable victim
race effect in these data.
One proposed explanation for the above findings is that sentence lengths are driven, in part, by a
taste for vengeance. Since this taste may operate at a subconscious level, it would not be
surprising if victim characteristics still motivate this taste, even when the victim is random. The
presence of victim effects in vehicular homicides suggests to us that the taste for vengeance is an
important determinant of actual sentence lengths. However, one should not ignore the fact that
the basic optimal punishment model has a great deal of explanatory power. Both optimal
punishment and a taste for vengeance appear to drive sentencing in homicides.
II.The Determinants of Punishment
In this section, we summarize the predictions of a version of the basic Becker framework. The
general formula for optimal punishment begins with the behavior of murderers. We assume
there is a supply of murders, denoted Me), which is a function of the probability of
apprehension, denoted P, times the severity of punishment, denoted S. To satisfy second order
3conditions, we assume that this function is declining and convex. We will treat the probability of
apprehension as exogenous and solve for the optimal severity of punishment.2
The social loss from the death of a victim is denoted V. This loss is meant to include the loss to
the victim and to the rest of society. The social cost of imposing a sentence of severity S on a
criminal of type T is C times S. This cost is meant to be high for individuals who produce much
for society at large. The social cost of prison will be low for people with high recidivism rates
who are likely to commit socially damaging crimes if they are released. The social planner then
would choose the level of severity to minimize M(PS)[V+PCS}. Optimization produces the
M eTM M PSM'(PS) formula S =*
,wheres =— , theelasticity of the murder rate with
Pc (i—c) M(PS)
respect to the quantity of punishment.
If this elasticity is treated as a constant parameter, then this equation yields four comparative
statics that are at the core of the normative implications of economic approach to punishment.
Severity (i.e. sentence length) should be higher when the deterrence elasticity is higher. Severity
should be higher when the victim is valued more by society, or when the recidivism rate is high.
Increases in deterrence elasticity should increase sentence length. As the probability of
apprehension rises, the sentence length should fall. We will test all of these hypotheses.
One thing that the optimal deterrence model does not predict is that random features of the crime
should be part of the punishment. Punishing criminals on the basis of the random characteristics
of criminals just introduces extra randomness into sentencing and serves no purpose according to
this model.3 Randomness in punishment is undesirable for many reasons. For example, it may
be that costs of punishment to the victim rise more slowly with randonmess than the costs of
punishment to the state (see Polinksy and Shavell, 1984, for a discussion).4
Ill.Data Description
2Ourbasic set-up builds upon that of several authors including Becker (1968), Posner (1981), Polinsky and Shaveil,
(1984).
If the conditions that make random punishment undesirable are not met, then this just means that we should see
random punishment, not punishment based on the random characteristics of victims.
Note that many features of the criminal justice system, such as sentencing guidelines, are designed to reduce
randomness in punishment. See for example published reports from the Massachusetts Commission for Sentencing
Guidelines.
4Our first data set is the Bureau of Justice Statistics "Murder Cases in 33 Large Urban Counties."
This is a random sample of homicide cases drawn from prosecutors' files. The data set includes
information on offender characteristics, victim characteristics and trial outcomes for 2800
murders. The 75 largest counties account for more than half of the murders in the U.S each
year. This data set brings together information on the crime, the offender,the victim., and the
sentence. Such information cannot all be linked in other larger data sets such as the Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) Data or the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Most crime
data sets are institutionally based, so that the Department of Corrections can tell us about the
number of prisoners moving in and out of the prison system, or the FBI can give us numbers on
complaints and arrests. But such data sets do not allow us to follow an offender and victim from
the commission of the crime, through arrest, the judicial system and sentencing.
When we compare the circumstances of the murders in our data set with the data in the much
larger Uniform Crime Reports Supplementary Homicide Reports, the distribution across
homicide types (circumstances) is similar. Appendix Table 1 gives a complete set of means and
standard deviations for our primary data set. While we have solid data on the prior criminal
history of both the criminal and the victim, we have only limited other demographic information
on each individual. We know age, gender and race and for a subsample of the data we have hand
coded occupational information. We use the mean income in the occupation as a proxy for tme
income.5
All of these cases are ones in which a homicide related charge was filed. In our data, 76 percent
of the cases led to a conviction. Table 2 presents an overview of conviction rates by types of
homicides. Of these cases, less than 1 percent of offenders receive the death penalty and 9
percent receive life in prison. As we will generally attempt to workwith a single attribute
"sentence length," there is an issue as to how we treat life sentences. We will generally treat a
life sentence as a 50 year sentence, but our results are robust to alternate treatments of life
sentences.
Table I also presents an overview of sentence lengths and conviction rates by types of murder.
The harshest penalties appear to be levied against arsonists (50 years), although there are only 5
convictedarsonists in the sample, so this is surely measured with considerable error. Given the
Spossibility that arson can create truly horrendous social costs, it seems reasonable that this crime
is particularly singled out for a severe penalty. Among the other crime categories, murders that
are done by professional criminals in the course of other crimes receive harsh penalties (close to
30 years in many cases). Murders that are the result of arguments that are not part of other
crimes, appear to receive much shorter sentences, around 15 years. In general, murderers serve
approximately 50 percent of the length of the sentence to which they are convicted.6
One testable explanation for these findings is that they provide support for the marginal
deterrence hypothesis (Stigler, 1970). According to this hypothesis, because criminals are
already receiving severe penalties for their first crimes, to deter murder, tougher sentences must
occur for combining the crimes. To check for this possibility, we examine the correlation
between sentence length in crimes without murder and sentence lengths, for the same crimes,
when there is a murder.7 Across crime categories there is no relationship between the non-
murder sentence (which should be interpreted as the sentence for the crime if murder had not
occurred) and the murder sentence (which should be interpreted as the cumulative sentence for
both the murder and the other crime). This casts some doubt on whether America is generally
following a policy of marginal deterrence.
The Alabama Data: To construct a second micro-data set on vehicular homicide cases, we
obtained data from the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts and a number of Alabama State
offices. We merged data on offenders from court records with data on victims from the FBI
Supplementary Homicide Reports, death records from the Alabama Office of Health Statistics,
and accident records of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. For each victim, we know
age, sex, and race. The conviction rates and sentence lengths are comparable to those found in
our main BJS data set.
IV.Optimal Punishment
In this section, we describe the construction of variables relating to the role of deterrence,
incapacitation and sympathy for either the victim or the perpetrator. We then test for the
importance of these variables.
A non-trivial number of occupations were in the illegal sector (e.g. prostitute, mafia bodyguard). In those cases,
we ised the closest legal occupation.
6Seethe Sow-cebookof Criminal Justice Statistics orvarious BJS Publications.
6Deterrence Elasticities: To test the importance of deterrence, we want to see whether types of
murder that have higher deterrence elasticities receive stiffer penalties. Ideally, one would use
exogenous sources of variation in the level of punishment over space and testwhether different
types of crime respond differentially to these different punishment levels. However, the studies
that use exogenous variation in arrest rates (e.g. Levitt, 1998) do not distinguish between types of
homicides.
An alternative approach, which is sketched in Appendix 1, is to rely on the variation of murder
rates for different types of murder over space. As the appendix illustrates, differences in the
coefficient of variation across different types of crime are a function of the deterrence elasticity
of the crime rate and other differences over space in the attractiveness of particular types of
crime. The intuition of this effect is that if regions differ in their level of deterrence, then the
murder types with high deterrence elasticities will have big variation in their levels of space.
The murder types with low deterrence elasticities will have less variation over space.
Unquestionably, this is a noisy measure of the deterrence elasticity, but it is the best available to
us.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between this measure of deterrence elasticity and sentence
lengths across types of crimes. In general there is a positive relationship and the relationship is
significant. Murders resulting from lover's quarrels and other arguments have the least variation
(and probably the lowest deterrence elasticities) and the lowest punishment.
Probability of Apprehension: The next prediction of the Becker framework is that crimes where
probabilities of apprehension are low will be punished more severely. The Supplementary
Homicide Reports can be used to determine whether or not the police consider the case cleared
by arrest. While this is not exactly the apprehension rate, it is a good proxy.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between this apprehension rate variable and the average sentence
length. The relationship is negative, as predicted. The correlation across homicide types
between sentence and apprehension rates is —38 percent. Lover's quarrels, arguments and brawls
under alcohol have the highest probabilities of apprehension and the lowest sentence lengths.
Available upon request. In the interest of space, we did not include these results.
7Arson has a particularly low probability of apprehension and the highest average sentence length.
Of course, long prison sentences for arsonists may have more to do with the great potential for
social damage created by arson.
Incapacitation: We are particularly interested in measuring the propensity of various murderers
to commit further crimes. As high recidivism rates will lead to high elasticities of crime quantity
with respect to sentence lengths and as high recidivism rates reduce the average social cost of
putting someone in prison, individuals with a high propensity for recidivism will be more likely
to receive stiffer sentences. Our approach is to create a predicted recidivism measure for each
offender and to include that as a variable that might explain sentence length.
We use data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics "Recidivism of Felons on Probation 1986-
1989" data set. In Appendix Table 2, we show the result of a probit where the dependent
variable is "committing a violent crime while on parole." In this regression, we find that crime
characteristics tend to be quite important. Individuals who are guilty of robbery are very likely
recidivists.Gender, race and number of priors also matter. Our recidivism measureis
essentially an index that is higher for men, blacks, criminals with more prior arrestsand
individuals who are guilty of robbery and assault.
One problem with this data set is that we have a data set on recidivism for all criminalsand we
are considering the punishment of murderers only. (There are nosizeable data sets on the
recidivism of murderers.) Certainly, this is problematic but we have no reason to believe thatthe
same characteristics that predict recidivism among standard felonsdo not predict recidivism
among murderers as well.
In Figure 3, we show the relationship between recidivism and sentence length.Recidivism also
predicts sentence length. Lover's quarrel murders are again atthe low end of the recidivism
scale and the low end of sentence length. Robberies are at the high end of the recidivismscale.
The fact that arguments and lovers' quarrels have low sentence lengths and arelow on
deterrence, and recidivism and high on apprehension suggests that severaltheories exist to
explain sentence lengths for many crimes.
Table 2: In Table 2, we explore these variables in a simple regression setting. Inthis case, the
unit of observation is the murder. In the cases of the elasticity measure and the apprehension
8rate, there is only variation across type of homicide. The recidivism measure differs also by
offender characteristics. In all cases, the standard errors have been corrected to address the fact
that we do not have meaningifil heterogeneity across all of the observations in the regression.
In the first regression, we examine all three variables without any other controls. All three
variables are both quantitatively and statistically significant. A one-standard deviation increase
in the recidivism measure increases the sentence length by 12 percent (which is .1 standard
deviations).Sentence length rises with the elasticity measure and falls sharply with the
apprehension rate. As the apprehension rate increases by 10 percent, the sentence length falls by
almost the same amount. This quite remarkable result is the exact prediction of some versions of
the optimal deterrence model where expected punishment should be kept constant across types of
crimes. If anything we would expect the endogeneity of apprehension rates to mean that this
parameter is underestimated, because more effort may be put into apprehending more dangerous
murderers who are then given stiffer sentencing.
The second regression includes controls for conviction type. Much of the variation in sentencing
depends on whether the murderer is convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder or
manslaughter. The jury ultimately decides the conviction type. The judge, who is subject in
many cases to sentencing guidelines, determines the sentence afterconviction.8 We find that
controlling for conviction type makes no difference to the recidivism variable. Apparently, the
coimection between recidivism and sentence length works through sentencing, post conviction,
not through the actions ofjuries. Most of the effect of the elasticity measure disappears when we
control for conviction type. Forty percent of the apprehension rate effect disappears when we
include conviction type dummies.
The third regression includes controls for victim and offender characteristics. Our results on the
recidivism, variation and apprehension rates are not altered by these controls. There are very
striking effects of victim characteristics. Murderers who kill black victims receive 26.8 percent
shorter sentences.9 Murderers who kill male victims receive 40,6 percent shorter sentences. It
also appears to be true that when the victim is older the sentence is longer. The income variable
is positive—richer victims appear to lead to longer sentences—but it is not significant.
All of our results are robust to including state and county fixed effects
9One interpretation of our race, gender and age effects is that societyvalues women, whites and
the elderly more and therefore optimal punishment calls for stiffersentences of murderers who
kill these victims. However, there is little evidence that suggeststhat our society values women
more than men. Lichtenberg (1998) shows we generally spendslightly less researching diseases
the afflict women. In civil cases where there are value oflife judgements, male lives are
generally attributed a higher value. Many peoplebelieve that society discriminates against
women, not for them. The racial effects onsentencing may be despicable, but are still readily
explained under racist preferences and optimal punishment giventhose preferences The gender
effect is more of a puzzle, which we will return to at the end ofthe paper.
Table 3 shows the results of regressing sentence length oncharacteristics of the victim and
perpetrator. In the first regression we regressthe log (sentence years) for convicted murderers as
a function of victim characteristics, murderercharacteristics and circumstance dummies.'°In
general, characteristics of both the victimand the offender tend to be quite important. A male
offender receives on average a .47 log point increase inhis sentence relative to a female
offender. Offender age is insignificant. African-Americanoffenders appear to receive slightly
longer sentences but this effect is not statistically significant.Hispanic offenders do not receive
longer sentences.
Offenders with more violent prior convictions receive muchstiffer sentences. Controlling for
this variable is the crucial step towards eliminating the impactof offender race on sentence. One
interpretation of this fact is that there is no offender raceeffect on sentencing. Alternatively, past
discrimination may have lead to more violent prior convictions priorto this current crime, so
controlling for this variable could cause an erroneousconclusion of no racial prejudice towards
black offenders.
The victim characteristics are also quite significant.Offenders who kill male victims receive
much shorter sentences. One interpretation is that malevictims are more likely to have initiated
the conflict. We have been able to partially reject this interpretationby examining only murders
where the offender was the aggressor, and in those casesthe victim's gender is still quite
important.
Throughout the paper. we adopt the convention of referring to log pointdifferences as percent differences.
10The race of the victim is also quite important. Perpetrators who kill blacks and hispanics are
much less likely to receive stiff sentences than perpetrators who kill whites. There is no real
cross effect between the race of the offender and the race of the perpetrator. When victims are
gang members, sentences appear to be shorter by a sizable margin, butthis effect is not
statistically significant. Note from Appendix Table 1 that only 5% of the victims are gang
members. It is also true that when there are more victims, the sentences are stiffer. Killing a
victim with a past criminal record yields a shorter sentence.
Victims over the age of 65 are associated with much stiffer sentences. Young victims (less than
12 years old) are associated with lower sentences. This latter effect reflects the fact that younger
victims are ofien in child abuse cases for which sentences are lower on average. When the
victims are unemployed or prostitutes, sentences are shorter. We find that the female gender
effect is significantly reduced when the victim is a prostitute. One interpretation of this finding
is that society values these people less. An alternative view is that the taste for vengeance is
closely tied to the innocence of the victim.
The impact of offender race and gender is not new. For example, Baldus eta!. (1988) show that
death sentences are much rarer when the victim is black. Gross and Mauro (1998) show that
death sentences are more common when African-Americans kill whites. Spolm (1994) shows
the impact of victim race in sexual assault cases. While in a sense, we are only confirming a
well known race of victim effect, given the general nature of our data set, we think that finding
this effect in a national homicide sample is particularly important.
We also include a wide range of crime circumstance dummies. These are always significant and
they always take the predicted signs. For example, it is always true that whenthe victim
"provoked" the attack, the sentences are much shorter. Sentences are longer when themurder
took place in the context of a professional crime. Vehicular homicide offenders get by far the
shortest sentences.
In the second, third and fourth regressions, we examine the role that sentencing and conviction
play in determining the length of sentence. Regression (2) reports marginal effectsfrom a probit
regression where the dependent variable is whether the prosecutor brought a chargeof first
°Allregressions are robust to including county fixed effects.
11degree murder against the defendant. Murder one was actually charged in a majority of our
cases. There is a substantial race effect in which black victims are associated with fewer murder
one charges. Circumstance factors are also important. The gender of the victim is not correlated
with charging murder one. Other than past offenses, perpetrator characteristics are uncorrelated
with being charged with first degree murder.
In the third regression, we look at the probability of being convicted in a first degree murder
case. Here the gender effect appears strongly. Cases where women are victims are much more
likely to result in murder one convictions than other cases. Again, the race of the victim also
matters and when the victim is white, a murder one conviction is much more likely. The priors
of the victim are also very important. Since the victim effects really appear to matter at the
conviction stage, we suspect that it is a taste for vengeance among juries and prosecutors that
really matters.
The fourth regression looks at sentencing, controlling for conviction type. The gender effects are
weaker than without conviction type dummies but they are still quite significant. The coefficient
on victim male drops from -.4 15 to -.260, but remains quite significant. One way to interpretthis
change is that forty percent of the gender effect is being determined by differential conviction
rate and sixty percent by post-conviction sentencing. Victim income and age also matters in this
stage. The dummies for type of conviction are naturally incredibly strong for predictingthe
sentence length.
Tables 4a-4d present evidence on sentence rates as a ifinction of the race and gender of the
murderer and the victim.'1 These tables help us to think about whether there are interactions
between the race of the offender and the race of the victim. They also present our results in a
simple fashion. In Table 4a, we show the mean sentence length by the race of the murdererand
the victim. Without including any other controls, we find that white murderers receive a 3.7 year
shorter sentence if they kill a black person relative to a white person and black murderers receive
a 5yearshorter sentence if they kill a black person. Without including other controls, it also
appears that black offenders get longer sentences. Ifthe victim is white, then black offenders
appear to get a 3.3 year stiffer sentence and if thevictim is black then black offenders appear to
receive a 2 year longer sentence.
12Table 4b shows that the gender effects are even more striking. Male offenders receive a 6.2 year
longer sentence than female offenders if the victim is female and a 6.9 year longer sentenceif the
victim is male. Killing a woman also results in a substantially longer sentence. For male
offenders, killing a woman increases the sentence length by 4.2 years. For female offenders,
killing a woman results in a 4.9 year longer sentence.In the Alabama data set we find a
significant victim gender effect with female perpetrators, but not with male perpetrators.
One issue with these results is that gender and race may be correlated with attributes of the
murder that are not observable. To try and address this issue, and to further test the optimal
punishment hypothesis, we now turn to a narrow class of murders: vehicular homicides.
V.Vehicular Homicides
Vehicular homicides have the advantage that they are a relatively homogenous crime category.
Overwhelmingly, they involve substance abuse and reckless driving. To a first approximation, it
seems most likely that conditional upon the characteristics of the offender, the victimis random.
As such, optimal punishment clearly suggests that victim characteristics should not matter, or at
the very least should matter much less than in other homicides. Unfortunately, we have
relatively few vehicular homicides in the Bureau of Justice Statistics (142). We cast a wide net
going state-by-state to try and accumulate more records. Only in Alabama were weable to
accumulate more cases (another 46).
Tables 4c and 4d show the basic results on vehicular homicides. The gender effects remain and
seem to be about as strong as in the case of murders overall. In the Bureau of JusticeStatistics
data, the gap for male offenders between male victims and female victims is 5.1 years.The gap
for overall homicides was 5years.In the Alabama data, the gap is smaller: 2.77 years. The BJS
data also appear to show strong offender gender effects.
Table 5showsour results in a regression setting. In the first regression we include allof our
vehicular homicides. Forty-eight of these observations involve victims who are pedestrians or
people in other ears. The remaining cases involve people in the offender's car.Since these are
These are raw means include all people charged. The raw differences (in terms of years) are similar when we
13less likely to be random, in the second regression we include only cases where the victim is a
pedestrian or driving in another car. In both regressions, there are substantial victim gender
effects.Victim race remains quantitatively large in the second regression, but becomes
statistically insignificant. The past criminal history of the victim is quite important in both
regressions. It seems that drunken drivers who are "lucky" enough to run over males with a
criminal history face shorter sentences than drivers who run over innocent women. The third
regression gives results for the Alabama data set. Again, there is a substantial gender effect.
There is no race effect in the Alabama data set.
Overall, we believe that there are substantial victim effects that are strong even when the victim
is random. hideed, even if the victim is not purely random in the case of vehicular homicides,
there can be no doubt that there is substantially more randomness for vehicular homicides than
there is for other types of murders. At the very least, therefore, we would expect the effect of
victim characteristics to diminish for these types of homicide. However, the victim effects are
just as large as in cases where the murderer clearly selects the victim. These findings are
difficult to reconcile with the view that sentences reflect optimal punishment.
VI. Explaining the Results: The Taste for Vengeance
One alternative to the classical economic model of optimal punishment is that punishment
responds to tastes for vengeance among judges, juries and the citizemy as a whole. A rich set of
experimental results seems to confirm that human beings are often willing to sacrifice material
benefits to punish others; Romer (1995) develops an elegant model, which explains an
evolutionarily dominant taste for punishment. This taste for vengeance seems close to the
"outrage" model advanced in Sunstein (2000).
If punishment is based on the taste for vengeance of judges and juries, then the emotional
apparatus that determines the taste for vengeance may operate at a subconsciouslevel and
therefore may not respond perfectly to unusual circumstances of the crime. For example, the
emotional response to victim characteristics will probably not be altered all that much even if we
know that the victim was essentially random. Because the taste for vengeance is not the outcome
of rational thought, the knowledge that the murderer did not select the victim may not alter the
condition upon conviction. The regressions that follow condition upon sentence >0.
14demand for vengeance. According to this view, there is likely to be a much stronger visceral
response to a drunk driver who accidentally kills an eight year old girl than to adrunk driver who
accidentally kills a 22 year old gang member.Thus, a taste for vengeance based view of
punishment may help us to understand our results on vehicular homicides.
Past social scientists have connected the taste for vengeance with the innocence of the victim.
Adam Smith (1759) in Theory of Moral Sentiments connected the taste for retribution to "our
sympathy with the unavoidable distress of the innocent sufferers." Smith emphasizes the extent
to which the victims are innocent as a determinant of the thirst for revenge.t2If women are
thought to be mote innocent than men, then this may explain the pervasive gender effects. Our
results on victim criminal records and victims who are prostitutes are also easy to understand
using this idea. Anecdotally, we believe that the public is particularly anxious to punish men
who allegedly kill women (e.g. O.J. Simpson, Jack the Ripper, Klaus von Bulow, Sam Shepard),
or men who allegedly kill children (the Lindbergh baby kidnappers, Richard III).
Wile we have little evidence on these issues, as yet. Our suspicion is that the emotional
responses of juries are based upon (1) the degree to which they are able to identifywith the
victim, and (2) the degree to which the victim is thought to morally pure. Kerr (1978)
documents the importance of victim innocence (as well as victim attractiveness) in mock jury
trials.
VI.Conclusion
We have presented evidence on the determinants of punishment for murderers in the United
States. We find the characteristics of the victim, the offender and the crime all generally matter.
Much of these effects can be understood as implications of an "optimal" punishment model
where punishments are higher when there is a greater value to incapacitation or a greater
deterrence elasticity. Some of our results can be understood as the outcome of a greater desire of
society to protect particular types of people.
2Smithalso emphasizes that "our heart rises up agahist the detestable sentnnents which influenced [vi11ains]
conduct." This suggests the importance of intent and the state of mind of the perpetrator and might explain the rules
concerning first degree murder.
15However, we find the victim characteristics are also very important in vehicular homicides and
even in those vehicular homicides where the victim is a pedestrian. Optimal punishment theory
generally predicts that random aspects of the victim should not be important determinants of
punishment. But they are and this tends to supports a taste for vengeance view of the
determinants of punishment.
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17Appendix 1: Using the Variance of Crime Rates to Measure Relative Deterrence
We treat each subcategory of crime separately. In each location there is a distribution of private
net benefits of crimes. Within these net benefits we include the full range of psychic and
financial benefits from crime as well as the opportunity cost of time. The only component that is
specifically excluded is the costs of legal deterrence. We separate out these benefits into a
space-specific mean level of net benefits (denoted B) and a remainder "b." We assume that the
distribution of b is constant across space with cumulative distribution F(b) and density f(b).
There is also an expected level of deterrence, incorporating all of the expected punishment from
crime, which is denoted D, and which is assumed to differ over space but to be constant within
each location.
The quantity of criminals in each location are those for whom the benefits of crime B+b are
greater than the expected deterrence costs, D. There will be a marginal criminal, denoted b* for
whom b*=DB.Thetotal quantity of crime in each location will equal lF(b*)=lF(D_B). The
elasticity of crime with respect to deterrence is _Df(b*)/(1_F(b*)).
We let D and B reflect the mean levels of D and B across the entire U.S. and let k=fl.Ifwe
take a Taylor series approximation for F) so that
(Al)Quantity of Crime per Capita =1—F(b*) 1— F(b) —f(b)(D
—B—D+B).
Which means that elasticity of crime with respect to deterrence is Df(b*)/(1_F(b*)). Then
taking variances gives us that:
(A2) Variance of Crime Rates =f(b)2Var(D —B),
or that:
(A3) LogI img=LogI +LoglD8
Lflcrirne) L1—F()) P )
18which means that the logarithm of the coefficient of variation of this crime equals the elasticity
(approximately) plus an error term relating primarily to the variance of the deterrence and net
benefits over space. If this variance is constant across crimes there will be no extra bias. If this
variance differs, then there will be a question that the elasticity is measured with error and
typically the coefficient on the elasticity will fall below the true elasticity value.
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Robbery 32.3 17.9 .79 350
Burglary 32.1 17.5 .82 33
Sexual assault 36.3 17.9 .87 30
Arson 50.0 0.0 .83 6
Larceny 33.4 22.8 .71 7
Auto theft 33.5 19.2 .92 25
Romantic triangle 14.7 12.5 .83 58
Property/money 17.1 16.5 .78 263
Redress of insult!personal honor 14.9 15.2 .77 256
Matters of opinion 18.2 17.3 .81 134
Lover/spouse quarrel 18.0 16.6 .81 305
Barroom dispute/brawl 13.2 14.7 .69 67
Street fight 12.5 15.2 .84 32
Punishment for stealing drugs/money 20.0 16.7 .84 25
Bad deal/bad drugs 15.8 12.5 .87 39
Money owed 22.6 17.2 .61 72
Stealing drugs/drug money 24.6 18.8 .71 73
Disputeoverdrugs 20.1 16.3 .80 113
Other gang fight between rival gang 10.7 7.2 .88 24
Contract killing/Hit for money 30.9 18.6 .70 53
Total 27.6 19.8 .763086
Notes: These figures include life sentence and adjust it to bea 50 year sentence. Mean sentence is the
mean conditional upon conviction. Sample size includes convictions and non-convictions. Standard
deviations of conviction rates are p(l-p)".S and are not shown.
1Table 2: The Determinants of Sentence Length
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Log(Sentence Length)
Probability of 1.327 1.328 2.000
Recidivism (2.936) (3.878) (3.439)
Variance of Crime 0.031 0.012 0.034
Rates (elasticity (1.979) (1.466) (2.651)
measure)












Constant 2.826 1.885 1.819
(8.770) (9.840) (1.704)
Conviction type no yes no
dummies*
N 1772 1772 1772
Rsquared .02 .44 .07
Istatistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the crime type level. *Dnipjes for
murder 1,2, manslaughter 1.
7Table 3
Victim Effects in BJS Data:
Overall, During Arrest, During Conviction, During Sentencing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sentence Probability of Probability of Log(Sentence
Length) Murder 1 Murder 1 Length) with
being charged conviction conviction
at arrest dummies
Method of Estimation OLS Probit Probit OLS
Offender Male 0.470 -0.068 0.061 0.364
(4.835) (-2.000) (1.710) (4.971)
Offender Black 0.077 0.002 -0.016 0.066
(1.139) (0.040) (-0.430) (1.262)
Offender Age -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003
(-0.555) (1.070) (1.540) (-1.123)
Victim Male -0.415 0.010 -0.095 -0.260
(-5.048) (0.400) (-2.470) (-4.618)
Victim Black -0.274 -0.098 -0.091 -0.126
(-3.843) (-2.690) (-3.200) (-2.158)
Victim Age 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(1.372) (-0.750) (0.040) (1.277)
Offender number of 0.068 0.018 0.009 0.060
violent priors (4.622) (2.070) (0.900) (5.271)
Victim gang member -0.296 0.238 0.019 -0,246
(-1.051) (3.420) (0.390) (-0.969)
Victim # violent priors -0.084 -0.005 -0.053 -0.060
(-1.860) (-0.180) (-2.150) (-2.076)
Victim unemployed -0.286 -0.041 -0.080 -0.103
(-2.582) (-0.370) (-1.460) (-1.179)
Victim prostitute -0.625 -0.020 -0.104 -0.153
(-2.230) (-0.100) (-0.820) (-0.936)
Victim less than 12 0.002 -0.052 -0.006 0.010
years of age (0.017) (-1.170) (-0.100) (0.112)
Victim greater than 65 -0.049 0.020 -0.069 0.084
years of age (-0.268) (0.190) (-0.890) (0.634)
Constant 0.045 -1.279
(0.037) (-1.485)
N 1772 1772 1772 1772
Rsquared .16 .03 .07 .48
T statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the county level. All
regressions include controls forvictimincome and homicide circumstance dummies
(robbery, btirglaiy, arson, kidnapping, child abuse, vehicular manslaughter, family dispute,
romantic dispute). Conviction dummies in regression 4 are for first and second degree
murder and first degree manslaughter.
3Table 4a





Victim Black 0 1 Total
0 18.7 22.0 19.5
13.7 14.6 14.0
801 246 1047
1 15.0 17.0 16.9
12.9 14.0 13.9
73 1006 1079




Prison Sentences by Gender of Offender and Victim
Offender Male
Victim Male 0 1 Total
0 10.6 16.8 16.0
13.9 15.3 15.2
83 546 629
1 5.7 12.6 11.8
10.4 142 14.0
266 2204 2470




Prison Sentences by Gender of Offender and Victim
































Prison Sentences by Gender of Offender and Victim
Vehicular Homicides: Alabama Data
Offender Male
Victim Male 0 1 Total
0 10 5.5 5.8
5.61 5.53
1 14 15
1 2.46 2,73 2.65
3.22 2.93 2.96
9 22 31




Victim Effects in Vehicular Homicides
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
Log(Sentence Length) AllVictim isVictim is
Vehicular pedestrian pedestrian
Homicides,or otheror other
BJS driver, BJS driver,
Alabama
Offender male 0392 -0.094
(1.316) (-0,176)
Offender black 0.260 0.363 0.321
(1.323) (1.214) (0.425)
Offender age -0.017 0.042
(-1.649) (2.514)
Victim male -0.561 -1.261 -0.905
(-2.377) (-2.653)(-2.038)
Victim black -0.526 -0.179 0.129
(-2.021) (-0.386) (0.153)
Victim race missing -0.127
(-0.243)
Victim age 0.006 0.006
(0.937) (0.380)
Victim # violent -0.160 -0.448
priors (-1.753) (-2.162)
Number of victims 0.351 -0.008
(2.311) (-0.046)
Constant -3.530 8.230 1.214
(-1.128) (1.530) (1.930)
N 134 48 46
Rsquared .21 .40 .11
T statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the county
level.
Regressions 1-2 also include controls for victim and offender income, offender
number of violent priors, victim gang member.
6Source: BJS Murder Cases in 33 Counties
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Appendix Table1: BJS MurderData Set-- Summary Statistics
Variable -Obs MeanStd. Des'. Mm Max
sentence: life in prison 3836.00 0.09 028 0.00 1.00
sentence: death penalty 3836.00 001 0.09 0.00 1.00
sentence: in days include life sent 3124.00 7433.89 11765.46 0.00 18250.00
log (sentence) 2168.00 2.85 1.16 -5.21 3.91
sentence: years 2752.00 20.75 20.92 0.00 50.00
convicted (0,1) 3086.00 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
offendermale 3122.00 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00
offenderbiack 3102.00 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
offenderhispanic 3103.00 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
offender age 3060.00 29.82 10.76 15.00 88.00
offender< 18 3836.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
offender violent priors 3124.00 0.61 1.69 0.00 51.00
offender is dealer 3124.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
offender gang member 3124.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
prior relation wIvictim 2946.00 0.79 0.44 0.00 1.00
family relationship wI victim 3836.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
romantic relationship 3836.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
victim family or friend 3836.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
victimstranger 3836.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
circumstance: robbery 3836.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
circumstance: sexual assault 3836.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
circumstance: burglary 3836.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
circumstance: vehicular 3836.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
charge: first degree 3836.00 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
charge: second degree 3836.00 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
victim age 2925.00 32.97 15.46 1.00 87.00
victimmale . 3099.00 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
victim black 3055.00 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
victimhispanic 3836.00 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
alcohol in victim 1980.00 0,47 0.50 0.00 1.00
drugs in victim 1793.00 0,29 0.46 0.00 1.00
victimprovokedattack 2647.00 0.18 0.38 0.00 1,00
victimprior convictions 3039.00 0.21 1.46 0.00 51.00
victimis gang member 3111.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
victimpriorarrests 3111.00 0.76 4.51 0.00 51.00
plea bargain 3098.00 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
jury trial (versus bench) 1307.00 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
northeast 3030.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
south 3030.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
central 3030,00 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
west 3030.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
victim local 3836.00 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
number of victims 3120.00 1.05 0.27 1.00 5.00
offenderpriorarrests 3124.00 2.72 5.54 0.00 103.00
black offender on white vic 3041.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
offender 20-39 3836.00 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
offender 40+ 3836.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
victim2O-39
'
3836.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
victim40+ 3836.00 0,19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Note: Sentences truncated at 50 years; life and death penalty counted as 50 yearsAppendix Table 2:
Probits of Recidivism on Offender Characteristics




















number of priors 0.009
(0.004)
N 9,449
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Recidivism of Felons on Probation 1986-1989, Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Dept of
Justice
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11Figure 2
Sentence Length and Apprehension Rates across Homicide Types
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Apprenhension rate is measured as fraction of homicides in which police have a charged suspect
(i.e. report offender data) in the UCR Supplementary Homicide Reports
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Recidivism rates are fitted values based on offender characteristics. The coefficients for the
fitted values are estimated using the BJS data "Recidivism of Felons on Probation."
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